I. Introduction
Th e repeal of Regulation 4056/86 1 by Regulation 1419/2006 2 had two main consequences: on one hand, it terminated the unusually generous block exemption granted to the liner conferences; on the other hand it brought the tramp services eff ectively into the scope of the competition rules. Neither was really a surprise: Regarding the liner sector, the European Commission, supported by the European courts, has constantly underlined its disapproval against the wide and unlimited immunity granted to the price-fi xing maritime cartels and used every opportunity to restrict the boundaries of the block exemption.
3 On the other side, the exclusion of the tramp sector from the procedural rules provided for in Reg. 4056/86 has so far been considered by the sector as a political victory partly attributed to Greek pressure. However, with hindsight, it seems that this regime was not only ambiguous but also not easily justifi able from a competition policy perspective, especially following the adoption of Reg. 1/2003. Th e uniformity of the legal regime, undoubtedly preferable, now creates new challenges of interpretation and implementation.
Th e Ambiguous Exclusion of Tramp Services from the Scope of Reg. 4056/86
Th e Regulation 141 4 had very early deprived the European Commission of the power 5 to enforce competition rules in the transport sector. Reg. 4056/86 fi lled this gap for all kinds of maritime transport including passenger services, with the exception of tramp vessel services, as defi ned in Article 1(3)(a) of that regulation. In other words, a transport service qualifying as tramping could not eff ectively be caught by the European Commission 6 but only by the national authorities, through the application of national competition laws, according to Art. 84 EC. Inversely, a service not able to enter into the defi nition
